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ABSTRACT
Learning an event classifier is challenging when the
scenes are semantically different but visually similar. How-
ever, as humans, we typically handle such tasks painlessly by
adding our background semantic knowledge. Motivated by
this observation, we aim to provide an empirical study about
how additional information such as semantic keywords can
boost up the discrimination of such events. To demonstrate
the validity of this study, we first construct a novel Malicious
Crowd Dataset containing crowd images with two events,
benign and malicious, which look visually similar. Note that
the primary focus of this paper is not to provide the state-of-
the-art performance on this dataset but to show the beneficial
aspects of using semantically-driven keyword information.
By leveraging crowd-sourcing platforms, such as Amazon
Mechanical Turk, we collect semantic keywords associated
with images and then subsequently identify a subset of key-
words (e.g. police, fire, etc.) unique to specific events. We
first show that by using recently introduced attention models,
a naı¨ve CNN-based event classifier actually learns to primar-
ily focus on local attributes associated with the discriminant
semantic keywords identified by the Turks. We further show
that incorporating the keyword-driven information into early-
and late-fusion approaches can significantly enhance mali-
cious event classification.
Index Terms— malicious crowd dataset, semantic key-
word, event classification, crowd-sourcing
1. INTRODUCTION
Images associated with very different events can often be rep-
resented with similar visual attributes, as shown in Figure 1.
In Figure 1, both images include crowds as main foreground
attributes, yet we can immediately discern that the two images
contain drastically different semantic events. The content of
the right image is “malicious” as opposed to the left image be-
ing “benign” due mainly to some specific objects contained in
the image, such as fire, smoke, police, etc. The above obser-
vation indicates that exploiting relevant local attributes (lo-
cal objects) jointly with global attributes (the whole scene) is
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Fig. 1. A pair of similarly looking crowd images from differ-
ent events with relevant object contents.
quite essential to better discriminating the events containing
complex events. What is more important is being able to find
out which objects are more correlated (semantically meaning-
ful) than others with respect to a certain set of events.
In this paper, we introduce a new event dataset and then
conduct a study, which verifies our argument that identifying
highly relevant objects to associated events are crucial to im-
proving classification performance. We first collect a set of
images which contain two visually similar, yet semantically
different events: benign and malicious. Since most bench-
mark datasets [1, 2, 3] collected for event classification do not
deal with this problem, our newly constructed dataset will be
useful for the community. We also collect a number of key-
words that appear in each image in the dataset, as listed below
each image in Figure 1. We asked the users on the Amazon
Mechanical Turk to describe the semantic contents of each
image in terms of keywords without providing the semantic
event labels. Then we select non-overlapping distinctive and
frequently occurring keywords for the malicious event, which
we aim to identify and treat them as the representative “se-
mantic keywords”.
Secondly, we analyze how these human-driven sets of se-
mantic keywords align with the visual attributes inherently
learned by the naı¨ve event classifier. For this analysis, we
leveraged the visualization approach based on the top-down
neural attention maps [4] which indicate the regions on which
the deep CNN-based event classifier mainly focuses. These
“machine-driven” attention maps show that they clearly share
high relevance with the “human-driven” semantic keywords
although the classifier is not supported with any additional
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Fig. 2. Malicious Crowd Dataset. Example images for the benign and malicious events are shown. The groundtruth bounding
box information which corresponds to the selected malicious semantic keywords is also included in the dataset. Yellow, purple,
blue, white, and red boxes correspond to fire, smoke, helmet, police, and car, respectively.
semantic information in the learning process.
Lastly, we carry out a study to verify the practicality of
explicitly incorporating these semantic keywords using var-
ious fusion approaches, which include a novel CNN-based
architecture (IOD-CNN) developed by part of the authors [5].
We show that these keyword-driven information is effective in
helping out the event classification task regardless of whether
the information is used in an early- or late-fusion scheme.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
1. We introduce a new Malicious Crowd Dataset contain-
ing semantically different malicious/benign images,
crowd-sourced semantic keywords, and groundtruth
bounding box annotations for the objects correspond-
ing to the semantic keywords.
2. By analyzing the attention maps, we provide valuable
indications that even naı¨ve malicious event classifier
learns to focus on the regions which align with the se-
mantic keyword set.
3. We provide the community with novel findings based
on the empirical study, which verifies the practicality
of explicitly using the semantic keyword information
for malicious event classification.
2. MALICIOUS CROWD DATASET
We have constructed the Malicious Crowd Dataset which con-
sists of images along with the malicious/benign event labels.
It also includes the malicious semantic keywords and their
corresponding bounding box information for each image.
2.1. Malicious and Benign Crowd Images
The dataset contains 1133 crowd images equally split into two
classes: benign and malicious. A benign image would por-
tray a “non-alarming” scene, while a malicious one would be
alarming and potentially dangerous.
The images were collected from the web using vari-
ous search terms. For benign images, search terms such
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Fig. 3. Histograms of Relevant Keywords
as marathon, pedestrian, crowd, parade, and concert were
used. Terms such as riot and protest were used to gather the
malicious crowd images. Figure 2 illustrates some example
images from each class.
2.2. Semantic Keywords
Malicious Semantic Keywords Selection. To describe the
contents of each of the crowd images, Amazon Mechanical
Turk was used. A human was responsible for assigning five
keywords to each image based on what objects are observed
within. To ensure the accuracy of the Mechanical Turk re-
sults, we manually removed the keywords which were incor-
rectly assigned.
After successfully collecting the crowd images and cor-
responding keywords, identifying keywords only relevant to
the malicious class was necessary. We then constructed two
keyword sets, each acquired by selecting the most frequently
appearing keywords in the two given classes. In practice,
words that are commonly annotated in 5% or more images
in each class were selected. As a result of this thresholding,
the numbers of selected words for the benign and malicious
classes are 17 and 20, respectively. Selected words and those
frequency for both classes can be seen in Figure 3. We have
refined the set by eliminating the common keywords that
appear in both classes. This elimination resulted in nine ma-
licious keywords. We further eliminated keywords indicating
particular phenomena such as protest, riot, night, and vio-
lence. Then police, fire, smoke, helmet, and car are included
in the final set of malicious semantic keywords.
Image                   Attention map Image                     Attention map Image                   Attention map Image                   Attention map
benign malicious
Fig. 4. Example Images of Attention Maps. Naı¨ve event classifier is used. Red indicates strongly fired-up regions.
Table 1. Number of images where each keyword relevant to
the malicious image appears.
class images police fire smoke helmet car
benign 557 8 1 2 7 57
malicious 576 205 144 150 206 65
Annotation. After finalizing the set of malicious semantic
keywords, to provide the ground truths, we went through all
the images and manually labeled the bounding boxes for the
five objects which correspond to those keywords.
Table 1 shows the number of images where each key-
word (object) actually appears. While police, fire, smoke,
and helmet seem to be closely associated with the malicious
event, car is seen in both events with a similar frequency.
Note that the numbers in the table do not necessarily match
the histogram of malicious semantic keywords obtained from
crowd-sourcing. For example, police appears in 205 out of
all 576 malicious images at a rate of 35.59%, but is assigned
only to 28.50% of the malicious image by the Turks. This
is because the visual contents associated with these keywords
are not overly notable in several images. We can observe that
the frequencies of the selected semantic keywords show a no-
table gap between the two classes, indicating that the purpose
of the proposed keyword selection process is achieved.
3. VISUALIZING THE ATTENTION MAPS FOR
MALICIOUS EVENTS
As mentioned in Section 2, the final set of semantic keywords
is selected by carrying out a process with the human in the
loop which may bring certain heuristics. In order to analyze
how much these human-driven additional semantics are cor-
related with the actual event classifier, we have visualized the
attention maps which depict the “excited” or “fired-up” re-
gions on the images learned by the event classifier. To visual-
ize the attention maps, we have used the top-down neural at-
tention model [4] which uses the excitation back-propagation
scheme. We have trained a deep CNN-based event classifier
(‘Event CNN’ in Table 3) to be used for generating the atten-
tion maps. Example attention maps along with the original
images are shown in Figure 4.
We can observe that this naı¨ve event classifier (‘Event
CNN’), even without the additional semantic information, has
learned to focus on most of the selected keyword-driven ob-
jects. This verifies that the selected semantic keywords and
their corresponding objects are inherently being used in dis-
tinguishing the malicious events from the benign ones.
4. EFFECTIVENESS OF SEMANTIC KEYWORDS
4.1. Evaluation Protocol
The Malicious Crowd Dataset consists of 1133 images - 576
of 1133 are labeled as the malicious image and the rest are
labeled as benign. The dataset is randomly divided into train
and test sets which include 905 and 228 images, respectively.
Average precision (AP) is used as an evaluation metric.
4.2. Methodology
We demonstrate the effectiveness of semantic keyword-driven
information by using i) late fusion of classifiers or ii) IOD-
CNN (Integrated Object Detection CNN) [5], which can be
considered an early fusion.
Late Fusion of Event/object Classifiers. We have trained
five different object classifiers or detectors which correspond
to five selected keywords. For the rigid objects (helmet,
police, and car), we have used the deformable part model
(DPM), while two separate CNN classifiers were trained for
non-rigid objects (fire and smoke). A CNN classifier (‘Event
CNN’) for event classification was also trained. All the three
CNN classifiers were fine-tuned from [6].
A late fusion was performed on the output of these six
streams. This is to enhance the performance of the baseline
Table 2. Malicious Event Classification Accuracy. Late fusion approaches
Baseline Keyword-driven object Late fusion
(EventCNN) police fire smoke helmet car SVM-rbf DBF SVM-lin kNN LD LR EC
AP 72.2 58.6 56.3 68.9 53.2 49.1 74.2 75.7 75.8 75.8 76.0 76.3 77.1
Gain · · · · · · +2.0 +3.5 +3.6 +3.6 +3.8 +4.1 +4.9
event classifier. We tested several fusion methods which
include Linear Discriminant Analysis (LD) [7], Logistic
Regression (LR) [8], Support Vector Machines (SVM) [9],
k-Nearest Neighbor Classifiers (kNN) [10], Subspace-based
Ensemble Classifiers (EC) [11], and a Dynamic Belief Fusion
(DBF) [12]. For SVM, we used two different kernels which
are a linear kernel (SVM-lin) and RBF kernel (SVM-rbf).
IOD-CNN. Eum et al. [5] introduced a unified deep CNN
architecture which integrates architecturally different, yet
semantically-related object detection networks to boost event
recognition task. This architecture allows the within-network
sharing of the convolutional/fully connected layers across
event recognition and object detection tasks. This approach
can be considered as an “early fusion” which can be differen-
tiated with the “late fusion”. As the network is learned in an
end-to-end fashion, the training can be performed efficiently.
4.3. Experiments
Note that the purpose of this paper is not to provide the
state-of-the-art performance on this dataset but to provide an
empirical study which shows the beneficial aspects of using
additional information which are semantically-driven.
Late Fusion of Event/object Classifiers. Table 2 shows the
performance for the baseline model (‘Event CNN’), keyword-
driven object detectors/classifiers, and various late fusion ap-
proaches. Note that, the numbers shown below the ‘keyword-
driven object’ column in the table do not indicate the de-
tection/classification performances for the corresponding ob-
jects. Whenever an object detectors/classifier finds the corre-
sponding object in a given image, the image is classified as
‘malicious’. Thus, when the police detector detects a police
officer in a test image which is originally labeled as ‘benign’,
this instance is counted as a false positive for that detector.
Keyword-driven object detectors/classifiers do not pro-
vide better classification accuracy than the baseline. This
is because these semantically relevant objects are only seen
in small portions in the dataset. However, it is interesting
to notice that the accuracy can be boosted up consistently
across different fusion methods when the baseline classifier
is combined with these keyword-driven classifiers/detectors.
Keyword Information Helps Consistently. Table 3 shows
the event classification performance acquired by the selected
Table 3. Overall Performance Comparison. Early- and late
fusion approaches
Method Keyword Info. AP Gain
Event CNN No 72.2
+ Late fusion Yes 77.1 +4.9
Event CNN+ [5] No 90.2
IOD-CNN (Early fusion) [5] Yes 93.6 +3.4
IOD-CNN + Late fusion [5] Yes 94.2 +4.0
fusion approaches. The second row in the table indicates the
performance gained over the first baseline (‘Event CNN’) by
using the late fusion of separately learned classifiers (see the
baseline and the fusion result in Table 2). The next three
rows show the classification accuracy based on a different
baseline classifier (‘Event CNN+’). This baseline also does
not exploit any keyword information and is reported [5] to
have used additional treatments such as an ROI pooling and
a different training scheme. IOD-CNN [5] which embeds
the keyword-driven object information by early-fusion out-
performs its baseline (‘Event CNN+’) by 3.4 AP. When a late
fusion is added on top of that, additional performance increase
of 0.6 AP is acquired. See [5] for detailed description.
The results consistently show that exploiting the keyword-
driven object detectors/classifiers provides beneficial infor-
mation in boosting up the event classification performance.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We addressed a challenging classification problem where cer-
tain classes can be expressed by similar visual attributes but
should be distinguished from each other semantically. To
demonstrate, we have constructed a novel Malicious Crowd
Dataset with images representing two classes (benign and ma-
licious) that may look similar but are semantically different.
To provide additional semantic information, we collected a set
of semantic keywords using a crowd-sourcing platform. We
have confirmed the validity of these keywords by analyzing
the attention map visualizations for the naı¨ve event classifiers
(‘Event CNN’). We also provide an empirical study which
shows the practicality of using semantic keyword information
in enhancing the malicious event classification performance.
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